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The hazards associated with the critical flight phases of
civil as well as military flight operations can seriously
degrade pilot efficiency, and therefore aircraft
survivability, if the number or complexity of tasks that the
pilot must manage exceeds his/her capabilities. This thesis
explores the feasibility of applying artificial intelligence
(AI) research to the construction of a Survivability Manager
( SM ) knowledge based system ( KBS ) that will assist the pilot
by assuming a portion of the survivability task management
load. The application of KBS principles to survivability
management is illustrated using the normal and emergency
management procedures for a hypothetical engine fuel supply
system as a working example. Though the SM is not a reality
today, there is considerable research in both AI and
survivability enhancement studies to draw upon. It is
recommended that a prototype be developed using currently
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with the feasibility of using
artificial intelligence to assist the pilot in the management
of aircraft survivability design features and equipment.
Specifically, the intent is to propose the development of a
Survivability Manager, capable of partially or fully
autonomous control, for both civil and military aircraft. In
order to make the following discussion meaningful, several
terms must first be (re)defined.
The aircraft combat survivability discipline has
developed a vocabulary based upon a man-made hostile
environment. Those familiar with this field will find that
several of these terms have been broadened in context here to
include their application to civil aircraft. Aircraft combat
survivability is defined as "the capability of an aircraft to
avoid and/or withstand a man-made hostile environment"
[Ref . 1 : p. 1]. If the term survivability is expanded to
include flight safety in general, it could be defined as the
capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a
hazardous situation. Similarly, susceptibility is now
interpreted as the inability of an aircraft to avoid a
hazardous situation, and vulnerability as the inability of an
aircraft to withstand a hazardous situation. A hazardous
situation is one or more adverse conditions that, by design
or by chance, have the potential to degrade flight
performance. Flight performance degradation is measured by
the extent to which components, designed to provide that
performance, are functionally degraded.
It is recommended that readers who are not familiar with
survivability concepts review the glossary provided within
this document. Those desiring a more detailed presentation on
aircraft combat survivability are referred to Ball [Ref . 1].
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II. BACKGROUND : PROBLEM DEFINITION
Since its early development, the aircraft has had to
operate under less than ideal circumstances. Even today's
super-sophisticated designs are subject to the ravages of
defective workmanship, poor maintenance, bad weather, human
error, in-flight obstacles, and other aircraft. Military
aircraft must withstand man made hazards as well; hazards
specifically designed for the destruction of aircraft. There
are important distinctions between civil and military
hazards, but the pilot's primary responsibility in either
case is to ensure that, in spite of any adverse conditions
encountered, the flight is safely concluded. This chapter
will explore the nature of these hazards, and provide some
measure of the trained professional pilot's ability to cope
with them.
A. CIVIL AIRCRAFT HAZARDS
The general decline in the number of accidents per flight
hour experienced by civil aircraft in the last decade is a
direct result of the intensive training and sophisticated
equipment currently available to pilots, air traffic
controllers, and other support personnel. These impressive
statistics notwithstanding, there is always room for
improvement. Specifically, the relatively high proportion of
11
mishaps resulting from human error still gives excellent
incentive to take every conceivable effort to reduce them.
An analysis of the hazards these aircraft encounter is the
first step in any such effort.
1
. Mishap Statistics
Each year the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) reports statistics concerning aviation related
accidents that occur within its jurisdiction. The NTSB
defines an accident as an occurence incident to flight in
which:
"as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any
person (occupant or nonoccupant) receives fatal or
serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial
damage. " [Ref . 2: p. 80]
The NTSB's latest synopsis covers the period from 1975
through 1984 [Ref. 3]. Although rates (number of accidents
per 100,000 flight hours) and even numbers of accidents have
generally fallen since 1978, there are still too many. The
safest year in recent civil aviation history was 1984, yet
there were 173 accidents involving revenue producing flight
operations, resulting in 103 fatalities. Revenue producing
operations include airlines, commuters, and on-demand air
taxis. The statistics also reveal 2999 general aviation
accidents in 1984, with 998 fatalities. General aviation
operations refer to private, non-revenue producing, flying.
The number and rate for this category are much higher, due,
among other factors, to the enormous number of general
12
aviation aircraft. Unofficially, 1985 has already surpassed
these figures, and is recognized as one of the worst years in




In an effort to identify trends and significant
problem areas, the NTSB reports all probable cause(s), as
well as any related factors, for each accident. Factors are
those elements of an accident that further explain or
supplement the probable cause(s). These cause/factor




Environmental extremes include micro-bursts, wind shear,
turbulence, low visibility, hail, birds, and wet runways.
Cyclic fatigue, brittle fracture, electrical malfunction, and
fluid seal rupture are all examples of material failures.
Human errors are procedural and judgemental errors on the
part of the designer, manufacturer, pilot, air traffic
controller, weather briefer, maintenance and service
personnel, and any others directly or indirectly responsible
for flight safety. Of all the causes/factors listed, pilot
error is cited most often.
3 Critical Flight Phases
In reviewing accident statistics, it soon becomes
apparent that there are operational flight phases which are
more hazard intensive than others.
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According to the NTSB [Ref. 2], the five general flight
phases are:
1) Static - aircraft immobile on deck, engines idle
or secured.
2) Taxi - to takeoff or from landing.
3) Takeoff - run, abort, initial climbout.
4) In Flight - climb to cruise, normal cruise,
descent
.
5) Landing - approach, touchdown, roll out, missed
approach.
For the 1976-1981 period the NTSB reported that U. S. air
carriers sustained 58% of their accidents while in the
takeoff or landing phases.
4 . Hazards of Success
The capabilities, availability, and popularity that
the aircraft has gained in the past eighty years has made it
indispensable to modern civilization. It is ironic that this
success has, in a sense, increased the opportunity for
mishap. Aircraft have become bigger, faster, and more
numerous , and each of these advantages has a corresponding
disadvantage
a. Aircaft Size
The first commercial flight service was in 1919,
between London and Paris. The aircraft carried a maximum of
four passengers. Today, 'jumbo jets' carry up to five
hundred passengers from New York to Tokyo, nonstop. These
behemoths weigh over 400 tons and span almost 200 feet, wing
tip to wing tip. That is too many people with too much
inertia to expect favorable results in a mishap.
14
b. Flight Speed
History's first fatal accident in a powered
aircraft occurred in 1908. Lieutenant Thomas Self ridge was
killed as a result of a biplane crash, of which he was the
passenger. The pilot was Orville Wright. The top speed of
the craft was almost 45 miles per hour, apparently fast
enough to kill.
Today, supersonic transport (SST) air carriers cross the
Atlantic at Mach two plus. More commonly, large subsonic
transports cruise at about Mach point eight, which is roughly
one thousand feet per second. The obvious hazard of an
irresistible force meeting an immovable object is compounded
by 1) the limited reaction time available to prevent it and
2) the possibility that the pilot is not even aware of the
hazard.
c. Traffic Density
The number of IFR flights handled by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Route Traffic Control
Centers (ARTCC) has increased from 20.6 million in 1969 to
31.6 million in 1984. The FAA forecasts the number to rise
to 45.3 million in 1996 [Ref. 5:p. 1]. The total number of
aircraft actually in the air is even greater, due to the VFR
traffic that is not handled by the ARTCC. In 1984, the FAA
recorded 42.9 million IFR flight hours, which reduces to an
average of 4,897 IFR aircraft within U.S. airspace at all
times. This means that the airways are getting more crowded,
15
en route delays will become more frequent and last longer,
and the opportunities for collision will rise accordingly.
B. MILITARY AIRCRAFT HAZARDS
A major portion of military flight operations occurs in
non-combat conditions, even in time of war. The previous
discussion concerning civil aircraft hazards applies equally
to military aircraft in these conditions. While in combat,
the military pilot must also cope with a determined enemy
effort to shoot him down. In this condition, the hazards
can be of either external or internal origin. The external
hazards are provided by the enemy air defense system, and the
internal hazards are associated with task overload.
1 . Sophistication of Air Defense Systems
The proliferation of air defense systems which have
been developed to counter the threat of aggressor aircraft is
an acknowledgement of the potential destructive power of
these aircraft. With each gain in air power sophistication,
there has been an effective countermeasure developed to
neutralize it. Today, there are radar directed, high kinetic
energy guns; long range guided surface-to-air and air-to-air
missiles; and state-of-the-art high performance fighter
interceptors, capable of engaging multiple targets
simultaneously. Still under development are directed energy
weapons, using high power lasers and particle beams. The
list is endless, and the combat pilot must have the means to
16
cope with these threats if he is expected to perform
effectively and repeatedly.
2. Sophistication of Aircraft
Advances in technology, particularly in the last
twenty-five years, have nurtured the development of aircraft
capable of extremely complex operations under extraordinary
environmental conditions at incredibly high speeds. This
sophistication has brought two disturbing consequences. The
first is the concurrent improvements in air defense system
technology, discussed above. The second is the increasing
probability that the pilot will encounter task overloading
during critical flight phases, resulting in a fatal
procedural oversight. The number of cockpit controls and
displays has increased exponentially since the 1920s. The
result is a 'data rich, information poor' pilot, who must
make timely, effective use of it. The pilot must be
constantly cognizant of the aircraft health status, stores
inventory, navigational position, and tactical situation,
while simultaneously flying the aircraft, obtaining a fire
control solution, selecting munitions, employing air defense
countermeasures , evaluating component failure consequences,
and updating response priorities. Although some of these
tasks are currently being automated to some degree, the
potential for pilot overload during critical mission phases
is still very significant.
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C. HUMAN PERFORMANCE
Given the hazards outlined above, the capability for
rapid, effective action to prevent or minimize critical
component loss due to failure or damage must be enhanced
correspondingly. Trained professional pilot capabilities
notwithstanding, there is a limit to the number and
complexity of operations that a person can perform in a given
amount of time. Pilot functional overload is reached when:
(1) Response time exceeds safe reaction time or;
(2) Reaction complexity exceeds response
capabilities
.
Human capabilities and limitations have been
characterized by the Air Force Studies Board. Humans, as a
system component, can perform numerous mission and flight
essential functions which are not otherwise possible. They
have well developed perceptual abilities, including visual
and aural discrimination, pattern recognition, and speech
comprehension. They are capable of flexible control, in that
they can readily invent new procedures and adapt old ones to
new circumstances. An unavoidable partner to this
flexibility is a requirement for motivation. Humans perform
best in active, mentally stimulating conditions, thus making
them poor at repetitive tasking and watch-keeping. [Ref. 6:p
34]
The human brain possesses limited information processing
capabilities. The speed at which data can be absorbed,
processed, and responded to is finite, and can not be
18
appreciably increased. In addition, the human brain is
basically a serial processor, able to perform multiple
tasking only by rapidly switching through each one. [Ref. 6:p
35]
The errors associated with human information processing
include precision, capture, and sequential errors. Precision
errors are characterized by the incorrect identification of a
state among many similar but distinct states. Capture errors
occur when an incorrect, but familiar procedure is executed
in place of the correct, less familiar one. Sequential
errors refer to the improper order of step execution for a
given procedure. The number and severity of the errors go
up as the tasking increases. [Ref. 6:p 36]
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III. OBJECTIVE : AUTOMATE AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
MANAGEMENT
Given the capabilities and limitations of human
performance, there are three options available to enhance
pilot effectiveness during critical (high workload) flight
phases
:
(1) Improve pilot selection and training.
(2) Increase the crew size.
(3) Build 'intelligent' cockpits.
Option one would not be cost effective, because the calibre
of today's trained professional pilot is probably near the
peak of human capability. The cockpit workload is simply
threatening to exceed this capability. Option two has
historically provided a workload reduction by delegation, but
there are several disadvantages associated with the
additional personnel. For example, it has been estimated
that each additional 150-pound person in the cockpit requires
approximately 10,000 pounds of additional support equipment
[Ref. 6: p. 36]. It may be of greater importance to note
that, ironically, the additional personnel does not always
provide better performance. Complacency can compromise
safety in a multi-piloted aircraft, when division of task
load is not clearly defined. Recent design philosophy has
shifted to one man operable cockpits, in part, for these
reasons. Examples include the F-16, F/A-18, F-20 , LHX , ATA,
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ATF, and CASP . Even so, the Navy is now studying a proposal
by McDonnell Aircraft Company for the development of a two
seat operational version of the F/A-18 [Ref. 7]. The
justification given implies that the additional crewman
provides capabilities not otherwise possible with the
automation technology that is curently available. Regardless
of the number of seats, this conventional technology provides
the pilot (and crew) with execution aids that, as opposed to
autonomous employment aids, may not adequately reduce pilot
tasking in critical flight phases. Building 'intelligent'
cockpits, as option three suggests, could theoretically
provide this needed reduction. There are numerous facets of
the cockpit environment that could benefit from this 'built
in' intelligence, but this thesis is concerned with
survivability. Therefore, consider the incorporation of a
system specifically designed to actively assist the pilot in
maximizing the aircraft's survivability; a Survivability
Manager.
A. THE SURVIVABILITY MANAGER
Whether civilian or military, the pilot is charged with
three major responsibilities. In descending order of
importance, they are:
(1) Safety of personnel.
(2) Effective employment of the aircraft.
(3) Mission objectives.
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Any attempt to improve pilot performance must be measured
against his/her success in meeting these goals. The most
important measure of this success is survivability. With the
advent of cockpit automation, pilot performance (and
therefore survivability) has increased significantly. A
logical next step is to automate the management of
survivability features and equipment; that is, give the
aircraft a Survivability Manager designed to actively prevent
or minimize any flight performance degradation that might
result from a hazardous situation.
The extensive use of microprocessor technology in modern
aircraft design has provided subsystem status and control as
a base on which to build. For example, most automated
systems have built-in-test capabilities that self diagnose
functional health. These data bases could be drawn upon by
the Survivability Manager to monitor aircraft health and
performance potential. Since many of these same subsystems
are also computer operated, they may, in theory, be managed
by a computer possessing 'quasi-human' intelligence.
Suppose, for example, that a component failure is detected.
The Survivability Manager would selectivly reconfigure the
remaining operational subsystems to functionally replace the
failed component. The pilot has historically performed the
reconfiguration, but a computer with a modest inference
capability could also do it.
22
B. AUTOMATION GUIDELINES
In selecting the functions to be automated, careful
consideration must be given to the amount of interaction
desired between the pilot and the Survivability Manager. A
strict division of functional responsibilities is not
necessarily desirable. The degree of automation must be
carefully considered for each potential application.
According to Air Force studies [Ref. 6: p. 39], the degree of
automation employed should reflect the need to:
(1) Reduce excessive workload.
(2) Reduce errors.
(3) Improve performance.
(4) Add new capabilities.
Computers will never be truly intelligent, like people.
The subtle nuances and intuitive creativity of the human mind
are beyond the physics of semiconductors. It is therefore
difficult to conceive that pilots could be automated out of a
job (the limited utility of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV)
notwithstanding). However, there are many tasks that
computers can perform as well as or better than people. They
can complement pilot abilities by performing routine tasking
or watch-keeping. In addition, they can supplement or extend
pilot abilities. A case in point is the fly-by-wire flight
control system for the DARPA X-29 forward swept wing
aircraft. The dynamic instability of the aircraft is such
that, without computer control, it would be ripped apart in a
23
fraction of a second. The pilot simply can not react quickly
enough or precisely enough to directly control the aircraft.
C. LIMITATIONS TO CURRENT AUTOMATION METHODS
Conventional programming logics rely on exhaustive search
and numeric methods to solve problems. These algorithms are
incredibly fast at exceedingly tedious mathematical
calculations, making them effective tools for automation of
routine or well defined tasks. They do not lend themselves
well to rational processes, where non-numeric facts and
constraints must be considered. The conventional language
program (such as FORTRAN) possesses a rigid response
framework, from which it will analyze data and formulate
results. To require such a program to select an optimal
solution based on non-numeric considerations would invariably
invite disaster. What is required is a pseudo-intelligent
program, one that can reason in a quasi-human fashion; hence
the term , "Artificial Intelligence".
24
IV. APPROACH : ENHANCE SURVIVABILITY WITH
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be loosely defined as
the condition wherein machines think, or at least seem to
think, like people. Specific research in this relatively new
field of study includes natural language, vision, symbolics,
robotics, and expert systems. Expert systems, also referred
to as knowledge based systems (KBS), are the AI studies to be
addressed here. These systems use sophisticated problem
solving techniques and vast stores of knowledge to solve
problems that conventional programming methods can not.
A. THE KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM
In order to build knowledge based systems, the software
engineer must first be aware of the techniques that the human
mind uses, consciously or not, to attack difficult problems,
and the reasoning strategies used to guide the search for
solution(s). According to Lenat [Ref. 8: p. 204], humans
solve problems by applying their understanding of the
regularities of the solution space to constrain the search.
The techniques used to apply this understanding include:
1) Formal reasoning: use formal logic methods such
as resolution or structural induction.
2) Heuristic reasoning: use statistical probability
methods and if-then rules of thumb.
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3) Focus: be oriented toward specific goals.
4) Divide and conquer: break up a complex problem
into smaller, simpler problems.
5) Parallelism: work on several searches
simultaneously.
6) Representation: attack the problem from
several different perspectives.
7) Analogy: recognize the similarities of a new
problem to an old one.
8) Synergism: use a multitude of simple
relationships to solve a complex problem.
9) Serendipity: gather data and look for patterns.
It is essential to incorporate these techniques in the
construction of the expert system if it is to succeed at
performing intelligently, but it is not sufficient. There
must also be a reasoning strategy that guides the employment
of these techniques. The two most common reasoning
strategies are forward inferencing and backward inferencing.
In forward inferencing the attempt is made to reason forward
from the facts to a solution. In backward inferencing the
system will assume a solution and try to find supporting
evidence from the facts.
Assuming that the KBS is constructed to employ the
requisite reasoning techniques and strategies, it must also
have access to an enormous amount of basic knowledge. This
knowledge base must be comprehensive and unpolluted in order
to prevent deductive errors. Deductive errors include errors
of omission (a known fact that is not provided), and errors
26
of commission (information input that is inaccurate).
Moreover, there is a fundamental limitation to which any
logical reasoning process is subject: insufficient data. In
other words, if "THIS follows from THAT" can be validated,
then the system will answer YES. But if "THIS does not
follow from THAT", given an incomplete knowledge base, the
system may not be able to answer NO. In order to obtain a
KBS relatively free of deductive errors, the process of
acquiring the knowledge from domain experts must be
meticulous and exhaustive. Current techniques for knowledge
acquisition are slow and painful, and if AI is to become
truly practical, a more automatic means must be devised.
When the rational thought processes are clearly
understood, the software engineer can then begin to construct
the knowledge based system (Figure 1). Fundamentally, this
consists of a knowledge base and an inference engine [Ref.
9:pp. 22-23]. The knowledge base is the store of facts and
rules, provided by the domain expert, which pertain to the
subject of interest. The inference engine performs the
actual reasoning process using a combination of the reasoning
tools and strategies described above.
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The inference engine is essentially a program that is
capable to processing symbols that represent objects. In
Assertions Question
V V




Figure 1 . Knowledge Based System
contrast to conventional computer applications, where symbols
represent numbers and mathematical operations, the KBS symbol
can represent a person, process, concept, or class of
objects. The knowledge can be represented in several
different formats, with each format used for the knowledge it
represents best [Ref. 10: p. 32]:
(1) Production rules; situation-action or premise-
conclusion rules in which the first part (antecedent)
represents some pattern, and the second part
(consequent) represents a conclusion to be drawn when
the data matches the pattern. They are useful in
representing procedural knowledge.
(2) Semantic networks; taxonomic scheme wherein
objects are nodes and relationships are links
between nodes. They are useful in representing object
interrelationships
.
(3) Frames; format in which objects are represented
by certain standard properties and by
relationships with other objects. They are useful in
representing large amounts of knowledge about
object properties and relations.
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(4) First order logic; formal method of representing
logical propositions and relationships between
propositions. Useful in representing knowledge
in explicit terms.
Ideally, the knowledge would be encoded within the knowledge
base in the format that provides for the most efficient
utilization for the current problem.
B. A SIMPLE KBS ILLUSTRATION
A practical example will now be presented to illustrate
the applicability of the KBS to aircraft survivability. The
application to be considered incorporates both susceptibility
reduction and vulnerability reduction logics for a simplified
twin-engine aircraft fuel supply system. This fuel supply
system consists of identical port and starboard subsystems
which feed the port and starboard engines, respectively. The
primary components of each subsystem include a feed tank, a
transfer tank, and an external tank. The susceptibility
reduction logics seek to avoid fuel starvation, through
proper management of the available fuel supply. The
vulnerability reduction logics seek to minimize the loss of
usable fuel due to component failures. The domain knowledge,
which is encoded into the knowledge base, will be partially
represented by a set of production rules, which would be
provided by the domain expert (in this case the fuel system
engineer). In this example, the rules may be divided into
two groups; declarative rules and procedural rules. When the
declarative rule antecedent conditions are satisfied, the SM
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adds the consequent to the knowledge base as an assertion.
When the prcedural rule antecedent conditions are satisfied,
the SM performs, or advises the pilot to perform, some
action(s). In addition to the production rules, the knowledge
base also contains facts that represent status of the fuel
supply system's critical components. These component status
facts are continuously updated by reports from appropriate
sensors
.
In a situation where probabilities must be considered,
each declarative rule antecedent condition would be 'tagged'
with its derived probability. The probability of the
consequent would then be computed using Bayes' law or some
other formal procedure of probability theory. For this
example, all probabilities will be assumed to be 100 percent.
In the following list of rules, the local variable 'X' stands
for either starboard or port, and is necessarily consistent
only within a given rule. The local variable 'Y' always
stands for the opposite to the value of local variable 'X'
.
This effectively cuts the number of required rules in half,
with a corresponding savings in required memory. A (D) is
used to identify a declarative rule, and a (P) identifies a
procedural rule.
RULES:
(1) IF FUEL FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS HIGH, THEN
ENGINE X WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO MEET ENGINE X
DEMANDS. (D)
30
(2) IF (FUEL FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS LOW) AND
(THROTTLE X IS CHANGED ABRUPTLY), THEN ENGINE
X WILL CEASE TO FUNCTION. (D)
(3) IF FUEL FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS ZERO, THEN
ENGINE X WILL CEASE TO FUNCTION. (D)
(4) IF (FUEL IS AVAILABLE TO ENGINE X BOOST PUMP) AND
(ENGINE X BOOST PUMP FUNCTIONS), THEN FUEL FLOW
PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS HIGH. (D)
(5) IF (FUEL IS AVAILABLE TO ENGINE X BOOST PUMP)
AND (ENGINE X BOOST PUMP FAILS FREE), THEN FUEL
FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS LOW. (D)
(6) IF (FUEL IS NOT AVAILABLE TO ENGINE X BOOST
PUMP) OR (ENGINE X BOOST PUMP FAILS FROZEN),
THEN FUEL FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS ZERO. (D)
(7) IF (FUEL IS AVAILABLE TO FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X) AND
(FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X IS OPEN), THEN FUEL IS
AVAILABLE TO ENGINE X BOOST PUMP. (D)
(8) IF (FUEL IS NOT AVAILABLE TO FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X)
OR (FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X IS CLOSED), THEN FUEL IS
NOT AVAILABLE TO ENGINE X BOOST PUMP. (D)
(9) IF (ENGINE X BOOST PUMP FAILS FROZEN) OR (FEED TANK X
EJECTOR PUMP IS CLOGGED) OR (ENGINE X FUEL DEMAND IS
ZERO), THEN CLOSE FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X. (P)
(10) IF (FEED TANK X QTY IS NOT ZERO) AND (FEED
TANK X EJECTOR PUMP IS CLEAR), THEN FUEL IS
AVAILABLE TO FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X. (D)
(11) IF (FEED TANK X QTY IS ZERO) OR (FEED TANK X
EJECTOR PUMP IS CLOGGED), THEN FUEL IS NOT
AVAILABLE TO FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X. (D)
(12) IF (FEED TANK X FUEL QTY IS LESS THAN MINIMUM) AND
(FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE X IS OPEN), THEN (OPEN FEED
TANK INTERCONNECT VALVE) AND (FLY WINGS LEVEL). (P)
(13) IF (FEED TANK X QTY IS FULL) AND (FUEL CAN NOT BE
TRANSFERRED FROM EXTERNAL TANK X OR TRANSFER TANK X
TO FEED TANK X), THEN CLOSE THE FEED TANK
INTERCONNECT VALVE. (P)
(14) IF (TRANSFER TANK X EJECTOR PUMP FUNCTIONS) AND
(TRANSFER TANK X QTY IS NOT ZERO), THEN FUEL IS
TRANSFERRED FROM TRANSFER TANK X TO FEED TANK X. (D)
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(15) IF (FEED TANK X IS FULL) AND (FUEL IS
TRANSFERRED FROM EXTERNAL TANK X OR TRANSFER
TANK X OR FEED TANK Y TO FEED TANK X), THEN
EXCESS FUEL IS VENTED TO TRANSFER TANK X. (D)
(16) IF (TRANSFER TANK X QTY IS ZERO) OR ((EJECTOR PUMP
FAILS) AND (TRANSFER TANK X CHECK VALVES FAIL
CLOSED)), THEN FUEL CAN NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM
TRANSFER TANK X TO FEED TANK X. (D)
(17) IF (EXTERNAL TANK X QTY IS NOT ZERO) AND (THE
EXTERNAL TANK PRESSURIZATION VALVE IS OPEN),
THEN FUEL IS TRANSFERRED FROM EXTERNAL TANK X
TO FEED TANK X. (D)
(18) IF (EXTERNAL TANK X QTY IS ZERO) OR (THE EXTERNAL
TANK PRESSURIZATION VALVE FAILS CLOSED), THEN FUEL
CAN NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM EXTERNAL TANK X TO FEED
TANK X. (D)
(19) IF EXTERNAL TANK X QTY IS GREATER THAN ZERO AND LESS
THAN TRANSFER TANK X (CAPACITY MINUS QTY), THEN OPEN
EXTERNAL TANK PRESSURIZATION VALVE. (P)
(20) IF (EXTERNAL TANK X QTY PLUS EXTERNAL TANK Y QTY IS
ZERO) AND (THE EXTERNAL TANK PRESSURIZATION VALVE IS
OPEN), THEN CLOSE THE EXTERNAL TANK PRESSURIZATION
VALVE. (P)
(21) IF (FEED TANK INTERCONNECT VALVE IS OPEN) AND
(WING X IS LOWER THAN WING Y) , THEN FUEL IS
TRANSFERRED FROM FEED TANK Y TO FEED TANK X. (D)
(22) IF (FEED TANK INTERCONNECT VALVE IS CLOSED) OR (FEED
TANK Y QTY IS ZERO) OR (WING Y IS LOWER THAN WING X)
OR (FEED TANK X AND TRANSFER TANK X QTY IS FULL),
THEN FUEL CAN NOT BE TRANSFERRED FROM FEED TANK Y TO
FEED TANK X. (D)
(23) IF FUEL TANK X INTEGRITY IS SEALED, THEN FUEL TANK X
WILL HOLD UP TO FUEL TANK X CAPACITY UNTIL SUCH FUEL
IS TRANSFERRED OUT OF FUEL TANK X. (D)
(24) IF (EXTERNAL TANK X IS RUPTURED) AND (EXTERNAL
TANK X QTY IS NOT ZERO), THEN OPEN THE
EXTERNAL TANK PRESSURIZATION VALVE. (P)
(25) IF (TRANSFER TANK X IS RUPTURED) AND (FUEL CAN BE
TRANSFERRED FROM EXTERNAL TANK X OR TRANSFER TANK X
TO FEED TANK X), THEN (OPEN THE FEED TANK
INTERCONNECT VALVE) AND (FLY WING Y DOWN). (P)
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FACTS:
1) RH EXTERNAL TANK QTY IS (ZERO/PARTIAL/FULL).
2) LH EXTERNAL TANK QTY IS (ZERO/PARTIAL/FULL).
3) RH TRANSFER TANK QTY IS (ZERO/PARTIAL/FULL).
4) LH TRANSFER TANK QTY IS (ZERO/PARTIAL/FULL).
5) RH FEED TANK QTY IS ( ZERO/MIN/PARTIAL/FULL )
.
6) LH FEED TANK QTY IS (ZERO/MIN/PARTIAL/FULL).
7) RH EXT TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED).
8) LH EXT TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED).
9) RH TRANS TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED).
10) LH TRANS TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED)
11) RH FEED TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED).
12) LH FEED TANK INTEGRITY IS (SEALED/RUPTURED).
13) RH ENGINE BOOST PUMP IS
(FROZEN/FREE/FUNCTIONAL)
.
14) LH ENGINE BOOST PUMP IS
(FROZEN/FREE/FUNCTIONAL)
15) RH FEED TANK EJECTOR PUMP IS
(CLOGGED/CLEAR)
.
16) LH FEED TANK EJECTOR PUMP IS
(CLOGGED/CLEAR)
17) RH TRANSFER TANK EJECTOR PUMP IS
(CLOGGED/CLEAR)
18) LH TRANSFER TANK EJECTOR PUMP IS
(CLOGGED/CLEAR)
19) FEED TANK INTERCONNECT IS (CLOSED/OPEN).
20) RH FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE IS (CLOSED/OPEN).
21) LH FIREWALL SHUTOFF VALVE IS (CLOSED/OPEN).




(23) RH WING IS (HIGHER/LOWER) THAN LH WING.
Consider the knowledge base above. The SM's function,
with regard to the fuel supply system, is to ensure that fuel
is available to meet engine demands as long as possible. This
maintained availability is the desired goal state toward
which the SM must constantly strive. It is therefore logical
to use a backward inferencing strategy to achieve this goal
state. As an initial state, suppose all components are
functioning correctly (as would normally be the case), and
that all six fuel tanks are full of fuel. The SM will be
monitoring both port and starboard fuel supply subsystems
simultaneously. If the fuel supply to the starboard engine
is of current interest, then 'X' corresponds to starboard,
and ' Y' corresponds to port. Starting with the consequent of
Rule 1 (i.e. ENGINE X WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO MEET
ENGINE X DEMANDS) as the hypothetical result, the inference
engine attempts to satisfy the conditions of the antecedent
(i.e. FUEL FLOW PRESSURE TO ENGINE X IS HIGH). It searches
the knowledge base for a sequence of actions, combined with
current facts, that will culminate in the maintenance of
these conditions.
Although the fuel flow pressure is in fact already high
in the initial state, it is not guarenteed to stay high.
Therefore, the SM continuously cycles through the knowledge
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base, searching for a sequence of actions to take that will
ensure that the fuel flow pressure remains high for as long
as possible. In this way, the SM finds that the consequent
of Rule 4 satisfies the antecedent of Rule 1; that Fact 13
(functional boost pump) and the consequent of Rule 7 combine
to satisfy the antecedent of Rule 4; that Fact 20 (open
firewall shutoff valve) and the consequent of Rule 9 combine
to satisfy the antecedent of Rule 7; and finally, that Fact
5 (full feed tank) and Fact 20 (clear ejector pump) combine
to satisfy the antecedent of Rule 9. Thus the, initial state
conditions (facts) are sufficient to achieve the goal state
conditions (hypothesis), as long as the initial conditions
due not change. However, conditions must change; fuel must
flow.
As the feed tank fuel is transferred to the engine, the
transfer tank automatically replenishes the feed tank, via
the transfer tank ejector pump and check valves (Rule 14).
This transfer rate is greater than any engine demand rate
possible, and the excess is vented back into the transfer
tank (Rule 15). All of this happens without SM intervention.
The SM will intervene only when procedural rules are fired
(i.e. the antecedent is satisfied).
When the quantity of fuel in the transfer tank plus the
quantity of fuel in the external tank is less than the fuel
capacity of the transfer tank, the antecedent of Rule 19 is
-satisfied and the SM directs that the external tank
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pressurization valve be open. If completed, this action is
reflected by a change in Fact 22 (pressurization valve open)
which, along with Fact 1 (external tank full), satisfies Rule
17. Rule 17 then 'asserts' that fuel is transferred from the
external tank to the feed tank. Finally, by Rule 15, the
transfer tank is replenished until, by Rule 20, the external
tank pressurization valve is closed.
Now, suppose that the starboard transfer tank begins to
lose fuel and that the appropriate sensor reports this
failure. Ideally, the sensor would report the failure cause,
mode, and degree. In this example, the mode is reported to
be a loss of usable fuel, the cause might be projectile
penetration, and the degree might be a gallon per minute.
Although the cause and degree of the fuel loss may not be
easily assessed, knowledge of the failure mode supplies
sufficient data for the SM to attempt to minimize the
degradation of fuel system performance. Rule 25 is fired by
the reported failure, causing the SM to direct the opening of
the feed tank interconnect valve and the lowering of the left
wing. These actions update Fact 19 (interconnect open) and
Fact 23 (left wing down), which allows fuel to be transferred
to the port fuel tanks. This action conserves fuel that
would otherwise be lost via the leaking tank. When the
starboard feed tank quantity drops below a predefined
minimum, Rule 12 is fired, which allows the port feed tank to
refill the starboard feed tank. When the starboard feed tank
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is again filled, Rule 13 is fired, which prevents fuel from
being vented back into the ruptured tank. The SM will then
cycle between Rule 12 and Rule 13 until a new fact fires some
other rule(s) into action.
This example has been oversimplified in the interest of
brevity and clarity. Obviously, there are other effects to
consider, such as fire hazards or significant structural
damage, associated with the damage/failure processes that led
to the loss of integrity of the starboard fuel transfer tank.
In addition, the remedial actions taken must be weighed
against possible adverse affects on the performance of other
systems. In this case, the flight control system may not be
able to trim out the lateral weight imbalance resulting from
the fuel redistribution from the starboard wing to the port
wing. It is assumed that the knowledge base would be
comprehensive enough to enable the SM to foresee and resolve
such conflicts, within the paramount constraint to sustain
controlled flight as long as possible.
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V. AI APPLICATIONS TO AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY
Aircraft combat survivability enhancement studies
emphasize the needs of the military aircraft in combat
conditions. Specifically, they seek to prevent enemy air
defenses from engaging friendly aircraft (susceptibility
reduction) and/or limit the damaging effects of such
engagements ( vulnerabilty reduction). However, these studies
are not exclusively applicable to military aircraft in combat
conditions. For example, the development of collision
avoidance equipment for civil aircraft is also an application
of susceptibility reduction principles. Similarly,
vulnerability reduction studies are relevant to all aircraft,
in that they are concerned with component failures which may
or may not be the result of damage that is intentionally
inflicted. Whether the aircraft is civil or military,
artificial intelligence will have widespread application
assisting the pilot in managing the systems involved. With a
Survivability Manager on board, the pilot will be free to
concentrate on flight safety and mission objectives.
A. SUSCEPTIBILITY REDUCTION
1 . Military Aircraft
There are six general concepts which can be employed to
reduce the susceptibility of military aircraft to combat
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damage: threat warning, noise jammers and deceivers,
signature reduction, expendables, threat suppression, and
tactics [Ref. l:pp. 198-221]. All of them can be enhanced to
some degree by AI management.
a. Threat Warning
Any on board equipment that senses and analyzes
enemy electromagnetic emissions must make this data useful to
the pilot. Simply inundating him/her with nonprioritized and
possibly extraneous data may well serve to lessen his/her
effectiveness, rather than increase it. He/she is primarily
concerned with the enemy's tracking, illuminating, and
guidance emitters, and he/she must react to these emitters in
the order of descending response urgency. AI is capable of
servicing these requirements. In addition, the emitter
classification and status determination can clearly benefit
from AI ' s ability to draw logical inferences from bodies of
evidence of various levels of abstraction inherently
containing some degree of uncertainty.
b. Noise Jammers and Deceivers
Timely and effective employment of these
electromagnetic countermeasures devices is dependent on
careful consideration of the dynamic tactical environment in
which the aircraft is operating. Obviously, this is an area
where the pilot could use an 'assistant' to suggest or
actively control such employments. The Survivability Manager
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could provide this assistance, given that it has access to a
knowledge base describing the tactical environment.
c. Signature Reduction
The aircraft signature includes radar cross
section, infrared radiation, visible and acoustic emissions,
and electromagnetic emissions from active sensors and
communications equipment. The state of current technology
could provide the pilot, and so the SM, with signature
reduction features that give some control over the magnitude
of these detectable emissions. For example, an
electromagnetic (EM) emitter master disable switch could be
provided, to effect total EM silence instantly on demand.
The optimum utilization of these features can be suggested,
or autonomously effected, by a properly programmed SM.
d. Expendables
Arguments identical with item (b).
e. Threat Suppression
This refers to actively neutralizing the threat
through weapons employment. Although AI would undoubtedly
find application with offensive tactical weapons employment,
it is an entire study in itself, and will not be pursued
here.
f. Tactics
Tactics refer to the way in which the aircraft is
employed in combat. An example of a tactic used to reduce
aircraft susceptibility is to fly an aircraft profile that
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will minimize the exposure time to the threat. The SM could
suggest defensive tactics if, as assumed in item (b), it has
access to knowledge bases concerned with the mission
requirements and the tactical environment.
g. Integrated Features
The greatest potential will be achieved with a
Survivability Manager designed to use an integrated systems
approach. For example the data from threat warning devices
could be analyzed to allow maximum effectiveness in the
various countermeasures employments. In addition, the
information could be presented so as to suggest defensive
maneuvers (tactics) that would give the threat emitters the
widest possible berth.
2 . Civil Aviation Aircraft
Most of the susceptibility reduction techniques apply
only in man-made hostile environments. Threat warning stands
out as the notable exception when the term 'threat' includes
those which are non-military. Within this definition,




Currently, most of the information that is
provided to the pilot concerning environmental extremes
comes, if at all, from sources outside of the aircraft.
These sources include pref light weather briefs, in flight
updates from Flight Service Stations, and Pilot Reports.
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Weather radars are the only widely available on board device
capable of warning of weather hazards, and they are limited
to the detection of thunderstorms and heavy precipitation.
The development of aircraft wind shear detection systems will
provide a real time alert for wind shear hazards, allowing
the pilot to better prepare for their effects. The sensor
data could also be fed to the SM, which could then suggest
(if not execute, in time critical situations) steps to avoid
or withstand the threat. Like the pilot, the SM will be most
effective when the aircraft sensors can provide a nearly
complete picture of the external environment,
b. Material Failure
Component material failures generally can not be
accurately predicted in flight. Either they are long term
phenomena, monitored by sophisticated ground maintenance
equipment and replaced well before failure occurs, or they
fail too rapidly to allow any pilot warning. However, there
are situations where appropriate action can be taken in
flight to avoid specific component failures. For example,
strain gages might be placed at strategic stress points in
the wing structure. The data from these sensors could be
compared with known structural strength limits to
conitnuously update the ' g' load limits. In the event of
unavoidable overstress conditions or structural damage, the
pilot would have a means to asses the new 'g' load that may
be safely applied to the aircaft. This principle of health
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awareness can be applied throughout the aircraft, giving the
SM the means to monitor the material strenth of major load
bearing components and to take steps to prevent them from
failing.
c. Human Error
The threat of human error is probably the hardest
to detect, due to the complex and unpredictable nature of the
human mind. Nevertheless, many errors can be detected in the
period after commission and prior to any irreversible
consequences. Since pilot error is the most often cited
cause/factor in accident investigation reports, it may be
inferred that the complacent and/or inexperienced pilot is
currently the most serious threat to aviation safety. Though
no amount of assistance can replace good judgment or
professional airmanship, a timely caution might have saved
many competent pilots from their one fatal mistake. An SM
programmed to monitor normal and emergency procedures, with
status sensor relays from the controls involved, could warn
against, if not actively prevent, such procedural blunders.
This is a logical sophistication of the warning, caution, and
advisory lights, which are designed as procedural decision
aids for the pilot.
B. VULNERABILITY REDUCTION
Vulnerability reduction features attempt to minimize the
degradation of aircraft performance as the result of combat
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damage. There are six general concepts used in the design of
these features [Ref. l:pp. 269-306]:




(5) Passive damage suppression.
(6) Active damage suppression.
Although designed specifically for the reduction of
vulnerable area presented to a combat damage mechanism, these
concepts may be applied to aircraft vulnerability reduction
for threats in general. Most of the vulnerability reduction
techniques are hardware design options, and do not lend
themselves to direct pilot (or SM) control. The exceptions
are active damage suppression and component redundancy,
seperately or in combination.
Active damage suppression features reduce vulnerability
by containing or minimizing the terminal effects of a damage
mechanism to a critical component, contingent upon detection
of those terminal effects by an appropriate sensor. For
example, the penetration (the terminal effect) of an engine
lube oil sump (the critical component) by a blast generated
fragment (the damage mechanism) will lead to the eventual
seizure of the engine. The engine oil pressure guage
indicates the resulting loss in oil pressure, allowing the
pilot to preemptively secure the engine. Although the engine
is functionally lost in either case, the difference in pilot
action could make the difference in surviving the loss.
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Component redundancy is achieved when the flight
essential function (eg. lift, thrust, or control) that a
component is designed to provide is preserved, even after the
functional loss of that component. Ideally there will be
several alternative components, or groups of components,
which are capable of performing the same essential function.
This critical component redundancy may be physical or
functional, partial or total, concurrent or contingent. If
it is contingent, there must be some controlling mechanism
that will sense the failure and subsequently activate the
redundancy. In its simplest form, the redundancy activation
mechanism can be reflexive, as in the deployment of a ram air
turbine when total loss of electrical power is sensed by a
solenoid. This technique is of limited application where the
complexity and degree of degradation require careful
consideration in the context of the current operational
environment. For example, consider a Navy tactical aircraft
making a field recovery. Failure of the landing gear
breaking system during the landing roll may dictate either a
long field arrestment or a go-around to a short field
arrestment. Automatically lowering the arresting hook upon
break failure is not an appropriate remedy, and could in fact
lead to disasterous consequences. In such cases, a more
sophisticated mechanism is required to activate the
redundancy. This sophistication can be provided by either
the pilot or the Survivability Manager.
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The principles of component redundancy and active damage
suppression can be applied together to synergistically
improve aircraft survivability. For example, a redundant
control rod that is jammed (the terminal effect), as a result
of blast-generated fragment impact (the damage mechanism),
could be disengaged from the control linkage by means of an
override switch (the active damage suppression feature).
Once the jammed component is correctly identified by the
appropriate sensor, the pilot or the SM could disengage the
jammed rod (active damage suppression) and engage the
remaining functional rod (component redundancy).
The most productive method for determining the functional
redundancies available for a particular aircraft design is to
refer to its critical component analysis. Specifically, the
kill tree (or kill expression) provides a clear presentation
of these relationships, for a given kill level (i.e. degree
of performance degradation), in a given flight phase (eg.
take off, climb out, en route cruise, etc. ). The task of
developing the knowledge base for the Survivability Manager's
vulnerability reduction logics can be further simplified by
encoding the failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) along
with the fault tree analysis (FTA) conducted for that
aircraft into the knowledge base. When thoroughly performed,
this study reveals not only the result of a particular
component failure but also any backup systems capable of
performing its function. This information, along with
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component functional status, comprises the necessary data
required by the inference engine to correctly deduce and
compensate for the failed component.
C. RELATED RESEARCH
1. Pilot's Associate (PA)
Underwritten by the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) through its Strategic Computing
Program (SCP), the Pilot's Associate is being developed by
the Air Force's Wright Aeronautical Laboratory (AFWAL).
Essentially, it is expected to assist the single seat fighter
pilot by providing 'phantom flight crew' (i.e. copilot,
weapon system operator, navigator, and flight engineer)
expertise in both critical and non-critical situations.
Initially, it will consist of four interactive expert systems
[Ref . ll:pp 8-12]
:
(1) A Situation Assessment Manager to assess the
external environment as well as internal
resources
.
(2) A Tactical Planning Manager to recommend optimum
tactical employment of the aircraft, given
mission objectives and restrictions.
(3) A Mission Planning Manager to refine and
redefine mission objectives, given current
situation, command, and intelligence inputs.
(4) A System Status Manager to monitor and diagnose
total system health and current/projected
status of all on-board systems.
The Survivability Manager proposed in this thesis is
partially assimilated to different degrees by each of the
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PA's four defined managers. If it were included as a
separate manager, it would interact with the other 'managers'
to provide the pilot with an assistant whose primary purpose
is to manage the lower level survivability decision
processes
.
2. Self -Repairing Flight Control System (S/R FCS1
This is another AFWAL research project. The S/R FCS
will maintain post failure flight stability in fly by wire
(FBW) flight controls by reconfiguring the multiple
redundancies in control surfaces. Current FBW aircraft do
not have this capability to recognize and account for
structual damage through modification of the control laws
that govern FBW operation [Ref. 12:pp 4-8]. Although
originally developed for use in the Advanced Tactical Fighter
(ATF), the principles would apply to all future combat
aircraft and may even find limited applicability in
retrofitting existing models. The SM could provide the S/R
FCS with the functional status of the various flight control
components, so that raconf iguration may be as smooth and
effective as possible.
3. Fully Automatic Digital Engine Control ( FADEC
)
Under development at the Naval Weapons Center, a
major goal of the FADEC program is to significantly reduce
engine vulnerability by fully automating the regulation of
engine controls. Given a thrust requirement from the pilot,
the system would adjust the control configuration to provide
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optimum (post-battle-damage) performance. Algorithms are
being developed to make the appropriate adjustments, once the
trouble has been identified [Ref. 13]. AI will undoubtedly




Computerized Automatic Test Equipment
Conducted by the Navy Research Laboratory, the
investigation centers around the development of a computer
generated testing strategy leading to implementation of
software for Built-in-Test (BIT) equipment [Ref. 14:p. 67].
This would provide the SM with a fault detection/isolation




Collision Avoidance System (CAS)
On board collision avoidance systems are currently
being independently developed by several avionics firms to
give pilots advance warning in situations where collision
with other aircraft is imminent. The CAS uses a miniaturized
version of the ground based air traffic control radar which
interrogates transponder equipped aircraft (most are) in the
vicinity for barometric altitude. This information, along
with accurate range and bearing information provided by the
radar itself, is used to predict collision hazards [Ref.
15"-pp 48-53]. There are various schemes used to advise the
pilot of these hazards and to suggest avoidance maneuvers,
but none use AI . Certainly, such a system could be
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integrated with the SM to subtly initiate the avoidance




These radars are sophisticated versions of the simple
radar altimeter which is found on all IFR certified aircraft.
In both cases, their function is to provide accurate ground
clearance information. This information is analyzed by
either the pilot or the automatic pilot, in terrain following
or terminal approach evolutions. It could also be made
available to the SM as a backup monitor to warn against, and




Wind Shear Detection and Alerting System
Built by Sperry Corporation as a part of the
Performance Management System ( PMS ) and currently under
company evaluation, this system senses significant changes in
horizontal and vertical relative wind velocity (wind shear)
and alerts the pilot with advisory lights, so that
appropriate compensation can be initiated well before the
pilot could otherwise detect the hazard [Ref. 16:pp. 30]. By
feeding this information directly to the autopilot, the SM
could initiate corrective action even sooner.
8 Integrated Electronic Warfare System (INWES)
The INWES program is expected to enhance aircraft
survivability by providing crew members with eloctro-optical
and elctromagnetic threat warning and, if required, indicate
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an appropriate countermeasure response. Weapon system
synergism is effected by using information provided by other
on board sensors and subsystems, such as communications,
navigation, and external sensors [Ref. 17:pp. 31-34]. INWES




Given the benefits of a Survivability Manager in the
cockpit to assist the pilot in survivability management, the
most challenging task to be undertaken (aside from funding)
is the actual design and construction of the SM. The first
step towards this goal is to define exactly what functions
the SM is expected to perform. Once this is done, it remains
to determine whether the required hardware, software, and
sensors exist in practical form. If not, is the technology
available to fabricate them? Finally, the system must be
tailored to the specific systems and physical constraints of
its parent aircraft.
A. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In order to define the functional requirements for the
SM, it is useful to first characterize the pilot's duties and
responsibilities with regard to survivability. The pilot
might be considered a physician of sorts, and his aircraft a
patient. He must constantly be aware of the health of his
aircraft. He must rapidly and accurately diagnose any
problems and prescribe a suitable remedy. Of course, a real
doctor would have the benefit of easy access to exhaustive
reference material, as well as the invaluable 'second
opinion' from other doctors. With the advent of AI , the
52
physician has also been given the means to obtain this second
opinion from a machine. MYCIN is an example of such a
medical expert system, one that is concerned with blood
infections and meningitis infections. Via interactive
consultation, the doctor inputs the symptoms and vital
statistics, and MYCIN produces a diagnosis and recommends
appropriate therapy [Ref. 18: pp. 39-44]. Clearly, this
Survivability Manager for people can find useful application
to aircraft, with an appropriate knowledge base. The major
difference is that the health would be directly monitored by
the SM.
The Survivability Manager can be designed to perform a
myriad of tasks which would otherwise require excessive pilot
action or consideration. Regardless of the scope of
involvement, the system must accomplish its tasking in five
basic phases: monitor, predict, detect, analyze, and respond.
1 . Monitor Aircraft Health and External Environment
The human brain can not reason without data, and the
expert system is no different in this respect. They both
require a nervous system, with suitable internal and external
environment sensors, to gather and convey this data. In the
cockpit, the data required can be obtained either by direct
sensor relay, or indirectly by subsystem self -diagnostics
polling.
External sensors provide the data required by the
susceptibility reduction logics to forecast external hazards.
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Examples include radar altimeter and collision avoidance
radar. Internal sensors can be further subdivided into
susceptibility reduction sensors and vulnerability reduction
sensors. Susceptibility reduction sensors are concerned with
control and actuator position reporting, providing positive
feedback while monitoring normal and emergency procedures.
If critical steps are omitted or transposed, susceptibility
goes up for the hazards these procedures are established to
avoid. Vulnerability reduction sensors report component
and/or subsystem failure mode and degree. A complete,
current picture of aircraft health is required for
vulnerability reduction logics to determine the most
effective subsystem reconfiguration possible.
2 . Predict Hazards
The susceptibility reduction logics rely on external
and internal sensors to provide thedata pertaining to
proximity to hazardous conditions. To be effective, these
logics must be able to deduce the hazard well before it
precipitates any component failures. This requires a
cause-and-ef f ect reasoning capability which the expert system
can theoretically supply. By extrapolation, the hazard may
be argued to include equipment malfunction and pilot
oversight. For example, a combat aircraft executing covert
ingress to the target may unintentionally be radiating some
form of electromagnetic energy. Note that, in this example,
the logics must be cognizant of the flight mission and phase.
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This would suggest an interface with the 'mission manager of
the Pilot's Associate program, under development at the Air
Force Wright Aeronautial Laboratory.
3. Detect and Isolate Failures
When a hazard can not be avoided, its damaging
affects must be sensed before suitable vulnerability
reduction measures can be applied. Failure mode and degree
must be accurately reported to ensure the widest possible
range of corrective actions available. Failure mode is the
nature of functional degradation, while failure degree is the
measure of its completeness. For example, a failure mode for
an engine may be a partial loss of thrust with a degree of
eighty-five percent maximum rated thrust available. The
precise determination of the mode and degree of component
failures requires a high degree of sensor sophistication and
proliferation. Fortunately, most subsystems in modern
aircraft are constructed with built-in-test circuits which
can provide the bulk of this information. The remainder will
have to be gathered by sensors designed for specific
survivability applications. For example, sensors designed to
report structural removal and over-stress conditions would






In a multi-factored scenario, such as an aircraft in
flight, there can be several plausible alternatives to act
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upon at any given decision point. Only one can be selected,
and a great deal of time can not be consumed in the
selection. A knowledge based system with sufficient memory
available can, in theory, identify and explore each viable
alternative and present them to the pilot. Further, it can
prioritize the list by optimal consistancy with flight safety
and mission objectives. This is the essence of the utility
of the expert system in survivability enhancement; the
ability to determine the best course of action based on the
analysis of internal and external data, given pre-defined
non-numeric constraints.
5 . Advise or Act
Once presented with the various alternatives, the
pilot may or may not choose to act on the one that the expert
system suggests. His decision would be based on factors it
has not been provided for consideration. For example, the
pilot may be the lead in a two plane flight, in which case
the impact of his actions on his wingman must be considered.
Conversely, it is conceivable that the situation may dictate
an immediate response to prevent a catastrophic failure. A
case in point is a sudden wind shear during final approach,
resulting in excessive vertical drop. A properly programed
expert system with suitable control interfaces could initiate
compensation procedures well before the pilot could react,
increasing the chances of surviving the hazard.
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Clearly, an enable switch must be provided to give the
pilot the prerogative to allow the expert system to act
autonomously. Further, the pilot should be able to select
the type and degree of autonomous tasking that the expert
system is allowed to perform. In any case, the SM must
inform the pilot of any actions taken.
B. SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
Today, the AI discipline is largely within the pure
research stages, with a limited number of systems thus far
developed for solving problems of modest complexity.
However, enough is known to estimate general system
requirements for an expert system for practical applications.
1 . Hardware
The Survivability Manager must be able to react in
real time to a dynamic, complex set of internal and external
conditions. This equates to a need for extremely high speed
processors and access to very large memories,
a. Processors
The so-called 'super computers', employing the
conventional Von Neumann serial processing architecture, are
being built with clock cycle times close to their minimum
useful limit. Since an electrical pulse can only travel .3
meters in a nanosecond, the clock rate is beginning to
constrain the very size of the computer. And yet, a
nanosecond may not be small enough in a serial processor for
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the enormous number of inferences per second required of an
SM of modest capability. Goodyear Aerospace's Massively
Parallel Processor (MPP) is an example of a new approach to
this problem, one that may prove both faster and cheaper
[Ref. 19: pp. 20-28]. The MPP design is essentially a
physical representation of the 'parallelism' problem solving
technique listed in Chapter VI. By building a system with
hundreds, or even thousands, of processors which operate
independently, the solution space search can theoretically be
completed in a corresponding fraction of the time. However,
there are some major obstacles to the development of parallel
processing machines for practical AI applications. For
example, processor interconnections and memory access schemes
must provide for efficient use of available processing
capabilities. Moreover, some means must be devised to break
down the problem and equitably distribute the pieces,
b . Memory
It has been said that knowledge is power, and
this is painfully evident to expert systems engineers. They
have found that the size of the knowledge base is even more
important than the efficiency of the inference engine. DARPA
has estimated that a 10,000 rule expert system is the minimum
size that could have practical military applications. Most
currently operational expert systems have fewer than 500
rules. The implication is that massive memory facilities
must be accessible to the SM, facilities that are not
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currently available. The current expert system computer
architecture utilizes an 18 bit address, providing a maximum
of 262,144 addresses. The 32 bit address computer, providing
for a maximum of 4.3 billion addressable memory locations, is
seen as the logical choice for future expert systems.
2 . Software
The expert system can not be efficiently programmed
using a conventional language, such as FORTRAN or PASCAL. To
fill this need, declarative languages have been developed
specifically for KBS applications. Currently, the two most
widely used expert system programming languages are "LISt
Processing" (LISP) and "PROgramming in LOGic" (PROLOG). Both
of these languages are effective building tools, but there
are significant differences. LISP is useful because it
manages data structures easily, and its programs can
manipulate other programs, but it has no tools for logic
programming. PROLOG is useful because it is essentially a
compiler into which the user merely inputs the encoded
knowledge base. The usual programming skills are not
required. However, this ease of implementation is also a
disadvantage, because it allows no efficient mechanism for
closely controlling a procedural activity. The KBS language





This is the greatest single challenge to the
realization of the SM. The SM must have access to properly
encoded domain knowledge, and lots of it. Although there is
no shortage of aircraft systems expertise, getting this
knowledge into a form that is useful to an expert system is
an extremely tedious, and not always successful, process.
Researchers have found that often times a domain expert (eg.
the pilot) may not be able to explain his/her reasoning in a




Although domain knowledge is essential to the
operation of the SM , it will be of no value to the pilot if
it can not be applied to his current situation. The SM must
also be able to sense the internal health and status of the
aircraft systems, as well as the external environment. This
can be accomplished through distributed resource sharing with
the dedicated microprocessors in the various aircraft
functional subsystems, or by direct sensor relay.
a. Resource Sharing
Most of the major systems in current commercial
and military aircraft models have imbedded mircroprocessors
that automate the operation of those systems for the pilot.
The system status reports they receive from the components
they control could theoretically be passed to the SM. The
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physical interconnection scheme used to accomplish this
transfer must account for the differences in architecture
between the processors involved,
b. Dedicated Sensors
If resource sharing is not feasible or system
status reports are otherwise not available for critical
components, then sensors must be fitted to the components;
sensors that report directly to the SM. Precise functional
information may be required (i.e. failure cause, mode, and
degree), which then requires a corresponding sophistication
in sensor design.
C. COMPATIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Assuming that it is possible to build a competent
Survivability Manager KBS , one of the last major design tasks
is to build it within the physical constraints of the parent
aircraft. This requirement is at odds with the systems
requirements. To limit the acceptable volume and weight
allocation necessarily limits the maximum processing and
memory storage capabilities. Of course, this is a problem
for avionics in general.
1 . Integration with Projected Aircraft
In keeping with the philosophy that survivability
should be designed in and not just added on, it is obvious
that the Survivability Manager will be most successful when
it can be incorporated into the earliest stages of the parent
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aircraft's development. This is especially important for the
SM, because it must be able to sense the functional health of
the aircraft in depth.
2
. Retrofit with Existing Aircraft
Existing aircraft may not be operational by the time
a working SM of practical importance is finally available.
Should major breakthroughs in research (funding) occur, it
will be extremely costly to effectively integrate the SM with
these aircraft. It may even be too late for next generation
aircraft, such as the ATA and the ATF. This because the
intimate interfacing that must be considered in the design
now can not rely on AI practical success later on.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
In spite of intensive safety engineering and well
developed flight procedures, civil aircraft survivability is
challenged by the hazards associated with the modern
operational flight environment. For the military aircraft
that is operating in a man-made hostile environment, these
hazards are compounded by hazards which are specifically
intended for the destruction of aircraft. Regardless of the
type of mission to be flown, the primary responsibility of
the pilot is the safe, effective employment of the aircraft,
and his/her performance is seriously degraded by these
hazards. U. S. National Transportation Safety Board
statistics reveal a general decline in civil aircraft
accidents in the last decade, but there are still too many,
and a large portion of these accidents can be at least
partially attributable to pilot error. Statistics for
military flight mishaps show a similar pattern. Pilot error
is often the result of task overload conditions. This
conclusion is based on the fact that most accidents occur
during critical flight phases when the pilot task load is
greatest
.
Conventional task load reduction practices seek to
enhance aircraft survivability by automating the execution of
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pilot-selected aircraft system functions. Although this
automation allows the pilot to manage several of the aircraft
systems simultaneously, it can lead to a 'data rich -
information poor' cockpit if the number or complexity of the
systems involved is great. This data rich condition will in
fact decrease the aircraft's survivability if the pilot
commits a procedural error while sorting through
nonprioritized and/or extraneous data. It is clear that
relegation of task management, as well as simplification of
task execution, is required to effectively reduce pilot
workload during critical flight phases. If larger crews or
improved pilot capabilities are not feasible approaches for
enhanced task management , then the avionics engineer must
build 'intelligent' sytems that can manage themselves. These
automated Survivability Managers (SM) would monitor aircraft
health and the external environment, and react to recognized
hazards in ways that complement or even supplement pilot
capabilities
.
Knowledge based systems (KBS), which are considered
studies within the field of artificial intelligence (AI), are
ideally suited to provide the pilot with an automated
Survivability Manager. The KBS relys on sophisticated
problem solving techniques and vast stores of domain-specific
knowledge to solve problems that conventional language
programs can not solve. The conventional programming
languages (e.g. FORTRAN) rely on numeric methods to solve
64
problems and can not efficiently handle problems involving
non-numeric relationships. In contrast, the declarative
languages used in knowledge based systems can employ
human-like reasoning techniques and strategies.
Conceptually, the KBS consists of a knowledge base and an
inference engine. The knowledge base contains the domain-
specific knowledge (provided by domain experts) required to
solve domain-specific problems. The inference engine
performs the actual reasoning process by employing some
suitable combination of reasoning techniques and strategies.
The application of KBS principles to survivability management
is illustrated in Chapter IV, using a hypothetical engine
fuel supply system as a working example.
Once the KBS capabilities are understood, the
applications to survivability enhancement are readily
apparent. In a military aircraft, the Survivability Manager
could detect, analyze, classify, and respond to threat
emitters and propagators through the integrated management of
the available susceptibility reduction features and
equipment. In a civil aircraft, susceptibility reduction
would be accomplished by pooling the external and internal
sensor resources to prevent damage due to environmental
extremes, material overstresses , and human errors. The SM
can assist with vulnerability reduction in both civil and
military aircraft through control of active damage
suppression and/or component redundancy features. The
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development of the SM can draw upon the efforts of the
Pilot's Associate, the Self -Repairing Flight Control System,
the Fully Automatic Digital Engine Conrol system, and several
other related research projects.
The SM can be designed to manage a number of distinct
aircraft survivability enhancement operations, but in all
cases this management must be performed in five basic phases:
(1) Monitor aircraft health, and the external environment.
(2) Predict hazards.
(3) Detect and isolate failures.
(4) Determine the optimal response.
(5) Advise the pilot, or act autonomously.
Aside from these functional requirements, there are systems
requirements that must be considered by the SM designer.
Processing speed must be fast enough to allow the SM to react
immediately to real or perceived hazards. Memory storage
space must be sufficient to include the enormous amount of
knowledge needed. The programming language should allow for
ease of knowledge infusion, yet be flexible enough to apply a
number of reasoning techniques and strategies. Systems
status data must be made accessible via resource sharing and
dedicated sensors. Finally, the system must fit gracefully







The knowledge based system is an emerging technology.
The KBS has already been proven in small scale applications,
and has even begun to enjoy significant commercial
development. Although a system which is large enough to
accomodate a Survivability Manager with modest capabilities
(on the order of 10,000 rules) has yet to be built, the
potential certainly exists. Of course, the first such system
may not fit into a C-5's cargo bay, let alone an F/A-18's
avionics suite. But even the single seat fighter pilot will
one day realize the benefits of an intelligent cockpit. The
capability for relegating lower level management processes is
sorely needed now, especially during the task-load-saturated
critical flight phases. Through AI , the Survivability
Manager will meet this challenge, but only after intensive
research and development efforts.
2
.
Recommendations for Further Research
There are a number of studies which must be conducted
to further investigate the feasability of building a
Survivability Manager. Although these studies will rely on
basic AI research, they should be centered on the specific
needs of the intelligent cockpit. The first study might
consist of defining a modest 200 rule KBS for an isolated
system in an actual aircraft, such as the F/A-18 power plant.
The aircraft's critical component analysis along with the
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flight systems manual will provide an excellent source of
basic knowledge for this purpose. Next, the method of
representing the knowledge in the knowledg base must be
considered. This entails selection of the hardware and
software to host the expert system. This selection will be
limited by available assets. Once the knowledge has been
properly encoded, a harness must be constructed to simulate
the various aircraft health status inputs required by the SM
prototype. Finally, the system should be tested using
realistic performance and failure data from the actual
aircraft. The SM prototype can then be tested under various
simulated adverse conditions to assess and refine the
correctness and timeliness of its responses. These studies
will not be conclusive, but they should be indicative of the
promise of AI for enhanced aircraft survivability.
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APPENDIX A (GLOSSARY)
ACTIVE DAMAGE SUPPRESSION- An aircraft vulnerability
reduction technique, wherein damage is sensed and
subsequently minimized or contained through activation of one
or more devices.
AIRCRAFT COMBAT SURVIVABILITY- The ability of an aircraft to
avoid or withstand (damage caused by) a man-made hostile
environment.
AIRCRAFT COMBAT SUSCEPTIBILITY- The inability of an aircraft
to avoid (damage caused by) a man-made hostile environment.
AIRCRAFT COMBAT VULNERABILITY- The inability of an aircraft
to withstand (damage caused by) a man-made hostile
environment.
AIRCRAFT HEALTH- The functional condition of the aircraft,
measured by its operational performance capabilities, and
dependent on the functional condition of its systems and
system components.
AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY- The ability of an aircraft to avoid
or withstand (flight performance degradation caused by) a
hazardous situation.
AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITY- The inability of an aircraft to
avoid (flight performance degradation caused by) a hazardous
situation.
AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY- The inability of an aircraft to
withstand (flight performance degradation caused by) a
hazardous situation.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE- The condition where machines mimic
human rational thought processes.
BACKWARD INFERENCING- A reasoning strategy wherein a solution
to a problem is assumed and a search for supporting evidence
is then pursued sequentially backwards to the known facts.
COMPONENT REDUNDANCY- A vulnerability reduction technique
wherein a function can be performed by more than one
component or groups of components.
CRITICAL COMPONENT- A component which makes a necessary
contribution to the performance of a flight essential
function. The loss of a redundant critical component will
not neccessarily result in a loss of a flight essential
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function, whereas the loss of a non-redundant critical
component will always result in the loss of a flight
essential function.
CRITICAL FLIGHT PHASE- A portion of the flight in which the
aircraft is especially susceptible to hazardous situations.
DOMAIN EXPERT- A person that is recognized as an authority
in the specific subject of interest and from whom knowledge
is acquired for a knowledge based system.
DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE- The knowledge that an expert in the
subject of interest provides to the KBS.
EXPERT SYSTEM- See KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM
FAILURE CAUSE- A primary event which significantly
contributed to the failure mode of a component.
FAILURE DEGREE- The extent or completeness to which a
component's performance has been functionally degraded.
FAILURE MODE- The nature of a component failure. For
example, a control rod may be either severed or jammed.
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA)- A procedure that
(1) identifies and documents all possible failure modes of a
component or subsystem, and (2) determines the effect of each
failure mode upon the capability of the system or subsystem
to perform its essential functions.
FLIGHT ESSENTIAL FUNCTION- A system or subsystem function
required to enable the aircraft to sustain controlled flight.
FORWARD INFERENCING- A reasoning strategy wherein a search
for a problem solution is conducted sequentially from the
known facts
.
INFERENCE ENGINE- The construct within the KBS that performs
the reasoning process.
INSTRUMENT FLIGHT RULES (IFR)- FAA supervised flight
procedures wherein the aircraft route, altitude, and airspeed
is dictated by ground controllers.
KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEM (KBS)- A computer system that uses
sophisticated non-numeric problem solving techniques and vast
stores of knowledge to solve problems beyond the reach of
conventionally programmed computers.
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KNOWLEDGE BASE- The construct within the KBS that contains
the encoded domain knowledge.
MAN-MADE HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT- Flight conditions that are
hazardous to flight safety due to the intentional employment
of destructive man-made devices.
SURVIVABILITY MANAGER- A knowledge based system designed to
assist the pilot in the management of the aircraft's
survivability features and equipment.
VISUAL FLIGHT RULES (VFR)- Flight procedures wherein the
pilot is solely responsible for the safe conduct of the
flight and is not under direct ground supervision.
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